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R&D-based growth theory suggests that a larger population size raises either the long-run rate 
of economic growth (“strong scale effect”) or the level of per capita income (“weak scale 
effect”), with far-reaching policy implications. However, for modern times there is little 
empirical support for strong scale effects and evidence in favor of weak scale effects is mixed, 
at best. This paper develops a simple overlapping-generations framework with endogenous 
occupational choice of heterogeneous agents and entrepreneurial innovations in which any 
form of scale effect is absent. A higher population growth rate has a negligible, possibly 
negative effect on the long-run growth rate of per capita income. Long-run growth is 
sustained also in absence of population growth and generally is policy-dependent. 
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Endogenous growth theory captures that knowledge accumulates through the arrival
of innovations which are an outcome of proﬁt-oriented R&D investments. Any set
of instructions for a quality-improvement, process innovation or a new good can be
applied without non-rivalry to the manufacturing process. It has been argued that,
therefore, the size of population inevitably aﬀects either the long-run growth rate of
per capita income (“strong scale eﬀect”) or its long-run level (“weak scale eﬀect”).
Strong scale eﬀects, featured by ﬁrst-generation models of endogenous growth (Romer,
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), are inconsistent with
the fact that the number of researchers has substantially increased over time while
productivity growth rates have remained relatively stable (see Jones 1995a,b).1 They
were successfully removed in a series of papers (e.g. Jones, 1995a; Dinopoulos and
Thompson, 1998; Peretto, 1998; Segerstrom, 1998; Young, 1998; Howitt, 1999). These
contributions instead predict the weak form of scale eﬀects (Jones, 1999). In fact,
conventional wisdom holds that “the weak form of scale eﬀects is so inextricably tied
to idea-based growth that rejecting one is largely equivalent to rejecting the other”
(Jones, 2005, p. 1089).
Dependency of long-run per capita income on population size has far-reaching pol-
icy implications. For instance, it suggests that goods market integration, by increas-
ing the size of the economy, raises living standards.2 Moreover, it suggests that the
demographic change which is projected for many developed countries will impede ad-
vancements of the world’s technological frontier. So-called “semi-endogenous” growth
models (e.g. Jones, 1995a, 2002, 2005) even suggest that economic growth is driven ex-
clusively by population growth in the long-run, as an implication of weak scale eﬀects.
It may therefore be argued on basis of R&D-based growth theory that governments
should take action to raise fertility.
1However, support in favor of strong scale eﬀects has been provided by Kremer (1993) for historical
(pre-modern) times.
2From an empirical point of view, however, the link between trade liberalization and per capita in-
come is subject to a lively debate which yet has not reached a consensus (see e.g. Rodrik, Subramanian
and Trebbi, 2004, and the references therein).
1In view of international linkages and associated international technological spillovers
it is beside the point to dismiss scale eﬀects by arguing that small economies like Lux-
embourg, Switzerland or Hongkong are among the richest. Cross-country studies which
examine the impact of larger population size on per capita income therefore account for
international trade relations. They provide mixed evidence in support of weak scale ef-
fects. For instance, Hall and Jones (1999) regress per capita income on population size
while controlling for instrumented “social infrastructure” − an index which includes
a measure of trade openness. They ﬁnd that population size enters insigniﬁcantly.
Frankel and Romer (1999) show that when trade volumes are instrumented for by ge-
ographical variables “there is a positive [...] relation between country size and income
per person”, which however is “only marginally signiﬁcant” (p. 387). Rodrik, Subra-
manian and Trebbi (2004) redo a similar analysis by using instruments for measures of
institutional quality as well, in addition to instrumenting trade volumes. In contrast to
Frankel and Romer (1999), they ﬁnd insigniﬁcant and sometimes even negative eﬀects
of larger population size on per capita income.3 Also consistent with the absence of
scale eﬀects, another strand of literature suggests that the impact of an increase in the
population growth rate on the growth rate of per capita income is either insigniﬁcant
or negative (Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Ahituv, 2001; Kelley and Schmidt, 2005).4
This paper develops a simple vertical innovation model where a larger population
size not only leaves the long-run growth rate unaﬀected but also the level of per capita
income. As not only strong scale eﬀects but also weak ones are absent, faster popu-
lation growth may not be positively related to the long-run growth rate of per capita
income. Long-run economic growth is sustained also if there is no population growth
3Similar evidence is provided by Bolaky and Freund (2006). See also Rose (2006), who employs
a large panel data set to examine the eﬀect of population size of a country on many economic and
social indicators (including GDP per capita). He concludes that small and large countries are not
systematically diﬀerent.
4It has been argued that semi-endogenous growth theory may, nevertheless, not be inconsistent with
the latter ﬁnding. If one allows for dilution eﬀects of larger population size, higher population growth
depresses the capital-labor ratio in the transition to a steady state, similar to neoclassical growth
theory. According to this reasoning, we do not yet observe steady state dynamics and a positive
relationship between population growth and income growth eventually may materialize (Jones, 2002,
2005).
2and generally is policy-dependent.
In the proposed model, heterogeneous individuals live in overlapping generations
and decide whether or not to become entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial ability is com-
plementary to the R&D process in determining the quality of ﬁnal goods. The focus
on entrepreneurial innovation is non-standard in the endogenous growth literature.5
This is surprising in view of a fast growing literature which has identiﬁed an impor-
tant role of entrepreneurs for productivity growth. For instance, Baumol, Litan and
Schramm (2007) argue that the driving force behind the advanced countries’ IT revo-
lution and the associated productivity growth surge in the last 15 years is due to the
development and growth of innovative entrepreneurial companies, like Microsoft, Intel,
eBay, Amazon, Google, or Federal Express. In another recent paper, van Praag and
Versloot (2007) provide a meta-study of 57 recent high-quality studies on the contri-
bution of entrepreneurs (young ﬁrms with less than 100 employees) for macroeconomic
performance. They conclude that entrepreneurial ﬁrms “engender relatively much [...]
productivity growth and produce and commercialize high quality innovations” (p. 1).
In contrast to the previous literature and reﬂecting the focus on entrepreneurial in-
novation of heterogeneous ﬁnal good producers, the framework abstains from assuming
that the aggregate production level is a function of some composite commodity index
of imperfectly substitutable intermediate products (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Ethier,
1982). The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is proportional to the size of the workforce in
the long-run. Although the entry process is modelled diﬀerently, this feature is also
contained in several vertical innovation models which remove strong scale eﬀects (e.g.
Peretto, 1998; Young, 1998) and is consistent with empirical evidence (Laincz and
Peretto, 2006). In the proposed framework, it also removes weak scale eﬀects.
Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001) as well as Strulik (2005, 2007) have shown that scale-
invariant endogenous growth is possible in inﬁnite-horizon models with an ever increas-
ing human capital level, like in Lucas (1988). For instance, in Dalgaard and Kreiner
(2001), the aggregate human capital level is proportional to aggregate ﬁnal output.
5For notable exceptions, see e.g. Clemens (2006) as well as García-Peñalosa and Wen (2008). They
consider occupational choice in the context of entrepreneurial risk-taking.
3As a result, higher population growth exerts a congestion eﬀect on human capital
per worker. It has the same impact as an increase in the depreciation rate of the per
capita level of human capital (Strulik, 2005, 2007). Consequently, long-run R&D-based
growth is not necessarily related to population growth in a positive way. The overlap-
ping generations structure in this paper abstains from assuming inﬁnite human capital
accumulation. For simplicity, and to put the contrast to the previous literature in its
sharpest relief, human capital is exogenous.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights scale eﬀect properties in
the previous growth literature, by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical inno-
vations. Section 3 develops and analyzes a vertical innovation model with endogenous
entrepreneurship which removes scale eﬀects. It contrasts the basic assumptions with
those in the analysis of section 2 to clarify the sources of scale eﬀects in the previous
literature. The last section concludes.
2S c a l e E ﬀects and Endogenous Growth
This section brieﬂy sketches the previous literature on endogenous growth by high-
lighting its scale eﬀect properties.
Consider ﬁrst a typical, linear homogenous production function of ﬁnal output in













0 <γ<1,w h e r et is a time index, LY is manufacturing labor, X is the quantity of a
composite good consisting of (a mass of) N intermediate capital inputs, and xi and Ai
denote the quantity and the quality of intermediate good i, respectively. Intermediate
goods are produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, with one variety per ﬁrm.
The labor force, L, is supplied inelastically to a perfect labor market. It grows at a
constant rate, gL ≥ 0.
42.1 Horizontal Innovations
In models of horizontal innovations (e.g. Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995a), R&D investment
is targeted to generate blueprints for new intermediate goods. That is, the number
of intermediate products, Nt, is a measure of the economy’s knowledge stock in t.A s
the focus is on horizontal innovations, quality indices of capital inputs are normalized
to unity in this subsection, Ait =1 . In a symmetric steady state equilibrium we have
xit =¯ xt and thus Yt = Nt(¯ xt)γ(LY
t )1−γ. Suppose that one unit of foregone consumption
can be transformed into one unit of any intermediate good. That is, K ≡ N¯ x is the









where ˜ k ≡ K/(NL) is the knowledge-adjusted capital-labor ratio and lY ≡ LY/L is
the fraction of labor devoted to manufacturing. Time in continuous. When LR units
of labor are allocated to R&D, knowledge accumulates according to




δ>0, where Romer (1990) assumes φ =1and Jones (1995a) assumes φ<1.6 In
both papers, there is a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) in which the fraction of
labor devoted to R&D and manufacturing, λ ≡ LR/L and lY =1− λ, respectively, as
well as the knowledge-adjusted capital-labor ratio, ˜ k, are constant over time and scale-
invariant. Hence, the long-run growth rate of per capita income equals the growth rate
of the number of blueprints, N.L e t gz denote the growth rate of a variable z and
k = K/L the capital-labor ratio. We have gy = gN = gk = δNφ−1LR.I fφ =1 ,t h e n
gy = δλL,w h e r eLR = λL has been used. Thus, in BGE (where λ is constant over
time) the per capita income growth rate is increasing in the size of the labor force,
L (strong scale eﬀect). If φ<1,b yn o t i n gt h a tgN = δNφ−1λL is time-invariant in
6For the production function employed here, Yt =( LY
t )1−γ R Nt
0 (xit)γdi, which is a simpliﬁed
technology of Romer (1990), the case φ =1is analyzed comprehensively in a recent survey article
(Grossmann and Steger, 2007). Jones (1995a) fully treats the case φ<1 for this technology.
5aB G E ,w eo b t a i nf r o md i ﬀerentiating with respect to time that gN =( 1− φ)−1gL.
Combining gN =( 1− φ)−1gL and gN = δNφ−1λL implies N =[ ( 1− φ)δλL/gL]
1
1−φ.
Thus, N is increasing in L. In view of (2) together with the properties that ˜ k and lY
are time-invariant in the long-run, this shows that there are weak scale eﬀects, if φ<1.
Moreover, the growth rate of per capita income, gy =( 1 −φ)−1gL, is proportional to the
population growth rate and policy-independent (“semi-endogenous growth”). There is
no exponential economic growth in the long run unless the population size grows: if
gL =0 ,t h e ngy =0 .7
2.2 Vertical Innovations
Next consider vertical innovations in a simple discrete time framework under technology
(1), i.e., quality improvements of intermediate goods. Higher quality of a good means
that it has higher productivity in the ﬁnal goods sector. Each period, ﬁrms may require
a ﬁxed labor input, f ≥ 0 (e.g. administrative labor for market entry and maintenance
of a ﬁrm). There is free entry of ﬁrms. The number of intermediate goods, N,i s
determined by the condition that net proﬁts of ﬁrms are zero in equilibrium. N is
constant along a balanced growth path. Quality-improvements occur according to




it−1 is R&D labor input in ﬁrm i and ¯ At−1 is the average quality of goods in
t − 1. Access to last period’s stock of knowledge reﬂects the standard “standing on
shoulders” eﬀect. ¯ A0 is given and positive. h is an increasing and strictly concave
function. (It also fulﬁlls other standard conditions which ensure an interior solution
for the R&D investment decision.) Moreover, h(0) = 1.T h a t i s , i f a ﬁrm does not
invest in R&D, Ait = ¯ At−1.
O n eu n i to ff o r e g o n ec o n s u m p t i o nc a nb et r a n s f o r m e di n t oo n eu n i to fc a p i t a li n p u t .
Hence, the marginal production costs in t are equal to the interest rate, rt.W i t h
7Groth, Koch and Steger (2008) show that the economy still may grow without bounds even if
gL =0 ; however, long run growth then is less than exponential.
6production function (1) and perfect competition in the ﬁnal goods sector, the inverse
demand function of the representative ﬁnal goods producer for capital input i is given
by pi = γ
¡
AiLY/xi
¢1−γ. Thus, an intermediate good monopolist i, by maximizing
proﬁts (pi − r)xi, chooses price pi = r/γ and thus output xi =( γ2/r)
1
1−γ AiLY.T h e
model is fully solved in Appendix A by assuming the standard intertemporal utility
function U =
P∞
t=0 Ltρt lnct, 0 <ρ<1,o fa ni n ﬁnitely-living representative dynasty,
where c denotes per capita consumption. It is shown that there exists a symmetric
BGE (i.e., Ait = ¯ At for all i). Substituting the solution for xi into (1), we thus ﬁnd
that per capita income is given by








t Lt,( 5 )
where n ≡ N/L (also recall lY = LY/L). Appendix A shows that in a BGE an increase
in population size (L) induces a proportional increase in the number of goods, N.I n
addition to n = N/L,a l s olY and r are independent of scale and time-invariant in
BGE. This implies that R&D employment per ﬁrm in BGE, lR∗, remains unaﬀected
when population size changes. Thus, the growth rate of productivity measure ¯ A is
independent of scale as well: according to (4), g ¯ A = h(lR∗) − 1. T h i si l l u s t r a t e st h e
basic idea of models without strong scale eﬀects like Peretto (1998), Young (1998),
Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and Howitt (1999). However, it follows from (5) that
in BGE per capita income is proportional to population size L; thus, there are weak
scale eﬀects. Moreover, in BGE per capita income grows at rate gy = g ¯ A+gL.8 Hence,
unlike in semi-endogenous growth models, long-run economic growth is sustained even
if there is no population growth (gL =0 ). One can also show that gy may be aﬀected
by economic policy.9
8To be precise, as time is assumed to be discrete, this is the approximate growth rate (use g ¯ AgL ≈
0).
9For instance, a subsidy to R&D investment (ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax), raises the equilibrium
R&D input per ﬁrm, lR∗, and thus the rate of productivity growth, g ¯ A = h(lR∗)−1,i ff>0 but not
if f =0 . See Grossmann (2008).
73 A Framework with Entrepreneurial Innovation
Now consider the following overlapping generations, discrete time framework with an
endogenous mass (“number”) of heterogeneous entrepreneurs who can invest in R&D.
B o t hg o o d sa n df a c t o rm a r k e t sa r ep e r f e c t .
3.1 The Model
Denote now by Nt the number of entrepreneurs in t,w h e r eN0 > 0 is given. They





0 <α<1,w h e r eqi is ﬁnal output of ﬁrm i, xi is its input of a homogenous producer
good, and Ai is a productivity index.10 Thus, the gross domestic product (GDP) of





T h a ti s ,u n l i k ei ns t a n d a r de n d o g e n o u sg r o w t hm o d e l s ,w h i c he m p l o yat e c h n o l o g ys i m -
ilar to (1), aggregate output of ﬁnal goods is not a function of a composite commodity
index of imperfectly substitutable capital goods. It rather reﬂects the deﬁnition of
GDP in national accounts.11
Entrepreneurs may diﬀer in ability, ai, which is positively associated with the pro-
ductivity level of their ﬁrm, Ai, for given R&D eﬀort. In each generation, entrepreneur-
ial ability is distributed according to a time-invariant and scale-invariant, cumulative
distribution function, Φ(a). The associated density function has support [0,¯ a], ¯ a>0.
10The assumption that the producer good (x) is the only rented factor in the ﬁnal goods sector
is made for simplicity. One could easily extend the technology to combine labor with the producer
good, as long as there are decreasing private returns in the rented factors. Under the assumption of
perfect competition, these imply positive proﬁts of entrepreneurs (the residual claimants). Otherwise,
individuals would not have an incentive to become entrepreneur.
11One may alternatively interpret the output of entrepreneurs as intermediate goods, which are
perfectly substitutable for ﬁnal goods production of a representative ﬁrm.
8Entrepreneurs may invest in R&D one period in advance of production. R&D aﬀects
productivity, Ai,a c c o r d i n gt o





i are eﬃciency units of R&D labor when entrepreneur i (with ability ai)
employs lR
i R&D workers; average productivity, ¯ At−1 ≡ (1/Nt−1)
R Nt−1
0 Ait−1, measures
the stock of knowledge in t − 1. ¯ A0 > 0 is given. Function h is, again, increasing and
strictly concave; it also fulﬁlls h(0) = 1 and standard boundary conditions. Opening
up a new ﬁrm requires a ﬁxed labor input, f>0. Fixed costs are necessary for the
existence of equilibrium, as will become apparent.
Total output of the intermediate good is denoted by X. It is produced according






0 <β<1,w h e r eK denotes capital input (in units of the ﬁnal good) and LX is labor
input in the producer good sector. Thus, an increase in the contemporaneous stock of
knowledge, ¯ A, is labor-saving in the intermediate good sector. This may capture, for
instance, a cross-sectional knowledge spillover eﬀect and is required for existence of a
BGE.12 For simplicity, capital can freely be rented at an internationally given interest
rate, ¯ r>0.13 In equilibrium, total output of the intermediate good is equal to its
aggregate demand, X =
R N
0 xidi.
Individuals live two periods in overlapping generations, where Lt is the size of the
population born in period t. It grows according to Lt+1 =( 1+gL)Lt,w h e r eL0 > 0.
In the ﬁrst period of life, each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor to the
12The proposed framework does not resolve the well-known problem that knife-edge conditions of
some sort are required to obtain a BGE in models of endogenous technical change (Jones, 2005).
13Appendix C deals with the case of a closed economy, where the interest rate is endogenous. The
main result, that larger population size has no eﬀect on GDP per worker in a steady state equilibrium,
remains unchanged. However, ensuring uniqueness of a BGE of the closed economy version of the
model would require further assumptions and the analysis would be signiﬁcantly less tractable, without
delivering important additional insights.
9labor market and chooses savings for old age. Moreover, individuals decide whether or
not to open a ﬁnal good ﬁrm and, if they choose to do so, how much to invest in R&D.
In the second period, individuals compete in the ﬁnal good sector if having become
entrepreneur or else retire. Each member i of generation t−1 maximizes the standard
utility function
u(cit−1,1,c it,2)=l ncit−1,1 + ρlncit,2, (10)
0 <ρ<1,w h e r ecit−1,1 and cit,2 denote the consumption level in the ﬁrst and second
period of life, respectively.
Finally, in order to examine whether and, if yes, how economic growth depends on
public policy in the long-run, suppose the government may levy a R&D subsidy, at
rate τ ∈ [0,1).I t i s ﬁnanced by a proportional value-added consumption tax with a
time-invariant tax rate. It will be easy to see that, under the log-linear utility function
(10), such a tax does not aﬀect entry or R&D investment decisions.14
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Let pt be the price of the intermediate good. As implied by (6), entrepreneur i born in
t − 1 chooses intermediate input demand according to pt = α(Ait/xit)
1−α = αqit/xit.
Under perfect competition, price p equals marginal production costs in the intermediate
goods sector, denoted by c.T h u s ,xi =( α/c)
1
1−α Ai.U s i n gpxi = αqi,t h ec a s h - ﬂow of
entrepreneur i, πi ≡ qi −pxi,i sg i v e nb yπi =( 1−α)qi,w h e r eqi =( α/c)
α
1−α Ai.U s i n g
(8), we obtain









for the cash-ﬂow of entrepreneur i in t.
Moreover, substitute qi =( α/c)
α
1−α Ai into (7) to ﬁnd that ﬁnal output per worker
in t, yt ≡ Yt/Lt,i sg i v e nb y







14Unlike in standard models, a lump-sum tax (typically assumed to ﬁnance R&D subsidies) would
not be allocation-neutrale in the present context because of its income eﬀects.
10From (12), one can already grasp the basic idea how the proposed model eliminates
weak scale eﬀects in BGE (where all variables grow at a constant, possibly zero, rate),
along with strong ones. To see this, suppose that − analogous to the vertical inno-
vation model of subsection 2.2 − in the proposed framework the following variables
are independent of scale: marginal costs (c), the number of entrepreneurs per worker
(n = N/L), and R&D inputs (lR
i , i ∈ [0,N]) which in turn determine the stock of
knowledge ( ¯ A). In this case, according to (12) but unlike suggested by the expression
f o ri n c o m ep e rw o r k e ri n( 2 )o r( 5 ) ,y is independent of scale L. The remainder of this
section shows that such properties indeed hold and derives comparative-static results.
Let w b et h ew a g er a t ea n dd e ﬁne ωt ≡ wt/ ¯ At (“productivity-adjusted wage rate”).






t ≡ ˜ c(ωt, ¯ r). (13)
Capital and labor demand in the intermediate goods sector are given by K = β
1−β(1−
β)−(1−β) (ω/¯ r)
1−β X and LX
t = β
−β(1 − β)β (¯ r/ω)
β X/ ¯ A, respectively. Using xi =
(α/c)
1
1−α Ai we ﬁnd that X =
R N
0 xidi =( α/c)
1



























An individual i who chooses to become entrepreneur and employs lR
i R&D workers
has to invest (1 − τ)wlR
i + wf in the ﬁrst period of life under R&D subsidy rate τ.






wt−1 − sit−1 − (1 − τ)wt−1lR
it−1 − wt−1f if i opens up a ﬁrm
wt−1 − sit−1 otherwise
(16)





(1 + ¯ r)sit−1 + πit if i is entrepreneur
(1 + ¯ r)sit−1 otherwise
(17)
in the second period of life. Utility function (10) implies that savings are determined
by the well-known Euler equation
cit,2
cit−1,1
= ρ(1 + ¯ r). (18)
Moreover, observing (11) and recalling  R
it−1 = ailR
it−1,t h eﬁrst-order condition for the
optimal R&D investment of an entrepreneur with ability ai > 0 can be written as
cit,2
cit−1,1









Combining (18) and (19), we ﬁnd that eﬀective R&D labor investment of entrepreneur














≡ ˜  
R(ai,ωt−1,ct,τ,¯ r). (20)
To gain intuition, note that the expression for  R
it−1 in (20) is equal to the R&D invest-




− (1 − τ)wt−1l
R
it−1 − wt−1f. (21)
Using  R
i = ailR
i together with expression (11) for πit and evaluating at ˜  R,w eﬁnd that
Πit−1
¯ At−1







1−α h(˜  R(a,ω,c,τ,¯ r))
(1 + ¯ r)ω
−
(1 − τ)˜  R(a,ω,c,τ,¯ r)
a
−f. (23)
As h00 < 0,( 2 0 )i m p l i e s˜  R
a > 0, i.e., more able entrepreneurs have a higher eﬀective
12R&D input and thus oﬀer higher product quality. (Subscripts on functions denote
partial derivatives throughout.) Moreover, higher future marginal costs in the interme-
diate good sector and higher (productivity-adjusted) wage rates today, by reducing the
future cash-ﬂow (π) and raising current R&D costs, respectively, give a disincentive to
invest in R&D (˜  R
c < 0, ˜  R
ω < 0). By contrast, a higher R&D subsidy rate raises R&D
input (˜  R
τ > 0), all other things being equal.
Individuals become entrepreneurs as long as the utility of doing so exceeds the
utility of those who retire in the second period of life. The ﬁrst result shows that this
will be the case as long as the value of net proﬁts is positive, i.e., individuals choose to
create a ﬁrm if and only if Πit−1 ≥ 0. Proofs are relegated to Appendix B.15
Lemma 1. (i) For all t ≥ 1 and given (ωt−1,ct,τ,f,¯ r), in equilibrium there is a
unique threshold ability level, at, which is implicitly deﬁned by G(at,ωt−1,ct,τ,f,¯ r)=0
such that all individuals born in t − 1 with ability a ≥ at become entrepreneur and all
other individuals retire when old. (ii) Deﬁning by ˜ a(ω,τ,f,¯ r) the level of a which is
implicitly given by
0=G(a,ω,˜ c(ω,¯ r),τ,f,¯ r) ≡ ˜ G(a,ω,τ,f,¯ r), (24)
we have ˜ aω > 0, ˜ aτ < 0.
Lemma 1 implies that, for a given ω (the endogenous productivity-adjusted wage
rate), a higher R&D subsidy rate τ fosters entry by reducing R&D costs (i.e., reduces
threshold ability level a). A higher ω impedes entry. Lemma 1 also implies that a share
1 − Φ(at) of the population born in t − 1 becomes entrepreneur; thus, the number of
ﬁnal good ﬁrms in t is given by Nt = Lt−1(1 − Φ(at)). Consequently, observing that
Lt = Lt−1(1 + gL), the equilibrium ratio of (old-aged) entrepreneurs to workers (the
15Throughout the focus is on interior solutions.




≡ ˜ n(at,g L), (25)
t ≥ 1.( N o t et h a tn0 = N0/L0 is given.) For a given threshold ability level, at, nt is
decreasing in the population growth rate, gL. This is an implication of the assumption
that individuals can compete in the ﬁnal good sector only later in life and are therefore
older than workers.16
In labor market equilibrium, total labor demand (the sum of labor demand in the









it + f)di = Lt. (26)
This condition implies the following.





















≡ H(at,ω t−1,ct−1,ct,n t−1,τ,f,¯ r). (27)
A steady state value of a variable z is denoted by z∗.F r o mL e m m a1a n d2w eﬁnd:
Proposition 1. Deﬁne
˜ H(a,ω,g L,τ,f,¯ r) ≡ H(a,ω,˜ c(ω,¯ r),˜ c(ω,¯ r), ˜ n(a,g L),τ,f,¯ r). (28)
(i) In BGE (a∗,ω ∗) are unique and simultaneously given by ˜ G(a∗,ω ∗,τ,f,¯ r)=0and
16It is not clear how relevant this eﬀect is from an empirical point of view. Fortunately, as will
become apparent, the main insights drawn from subsequent results are not inﬂuenced by the strength
of this eﬀect.
14˜ H(a∗,ω ∗,g L,τ,f,¯ r)=0as functions of (gL,τ,f,¯ r) . (ii) An increase in the R&D
subsidy rate, τ, raises the equilibrium (productivity-adjusted) wage rate, ω∗.
That an increase in the R&D subsidy rate, τ,r a i s e sω∗ can easily be understood.
First, a higher τ is associated with higher demand for R&D labor, for a given number of
entrepreneurs. Second, it raises the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs, all other things
equal (recall ˜ aτ < 0 f r o mL e m m a1 ) ,w h i c hi nt u r nr a i s e sl a b o rd e m a n da sw e l l . 17
One can also show that both the threshold ability value and the (productivity-
adjusted) wage rate in BGE, (a∗,ω ∗), are decreasing in gL. These results stem exclu-
sively from the impact of a higher gL on nt =˜ n(at,g L) and may therefore be of minor
economic signiﬁcance. Before we derive implications of changes in gL and τ for the
economy’s long-run growth rate, we ﬁrst address the scale eﬀect issue.
Substituting ct = ˜ c(ω∗, ¯ r) and nt =˜ n(a∗,g L) into (12), we ﬁnd that GDP per worker
in BGE is given by
y
∗
t = ¯ At
µ
α




∗,g L) ≡ ¯ At˜ y(a
∗,ω
∗,g L, ¯ r). (29)
It is also interesting to look at the capital-labor ratio of the economy, k = K/L.

















∗,g L) ≡ ¯ At˜ k(a
∗,ω
∗,g L, ¯ r). (30)
We obtain the following main result.
Proposition 2. In a BGE, both y∗
t and k∗
t are independent of population size
(absence of a weak scale eﬀect); for growth rates, we have gy∗ = gk∗ = g ¯ A ≡ g∗,w h e r e
the economy’s growth rate is also independent of population size (absence of a strong
17T h er e s u l to fa ni n c r e a s ei nτ on the equilibrium threshold level a∗ is however theoretically
ambiguous. To see this, note that a∗ =˜ a(ω∗,τ,f,¯ r);t h u s ,∂a∗/∂τ =˜ aω∂ω∗/∂τ +˜ aτ,w h e r e˜ aω > 0,
∂ω∗/∂τ > 0 and ˜ aτ < 0.










∗, ¯ r),τ,¯ r))dΦ(a) − 1 ≡ ˜ g(a
∗,ω
∗,τ,¯ r). (31)
According to Proposition 2, like in neoclassical growth theory and horizontal inno-
vations models like Romer (1990) and Jones (1995a), GDP per worker and the capital-
labor ratio grow in BGE at the same rate as the economy’s knowledge stock. Why
does this not go along with scale eﬀects? To remove strong scale eﬀects, the framework
maintained two critical features of the vertical innovation model in section 2. First,
the knowledge accessible for innovators equals the past period’s average productivity
level ( ¯ A) rather than, for instance, the sum of productivity levels of ﬁrms. Thus, the
number of ﬁrms, which is positively related to population size, does not matter for the
intertemporal knowledge spillover governing sustained growth (Young, 1998). Second,
the number of ﬁrms per worker, n = N/L, is independent of scale in the long-run. The
proportionality of the number of ﬁrms and scale is consistent with empirical evidence
(e.g. Laincz and Peretto, 2006). It therefore is a desirable property. In contrast to
standard endogenous growth models like those sketched in section 2, however, GDP
i st h es u mo ft h ev a l u eo fﬁnal output levels of the economy, as deﬁn e di nn a t i o n a l
accounting. It is not a function of a Dixit-Stiglitz type of composite commodity of
imperfectly substitutable goods. This feature of the proposed framework is of major
importance for the result that also weak scale eﬀects are removed, in addition to strong
ones.
3.3 Example and Comparative-Static Results
As is apparent from expression (31) for the long-run equilibrium growth rate, g∗,e c o -
nomic policy may aﬀe c te c o n o m i cg r o w t hi nt h el o n g - r u n . A ni n c r e a s ei nt h eR & D
subsidy rate τ directly raises g∗ by raising R&D investment, for a given share of entre-
preneurs and a given productivity-adjusted wage rate in BGE. However, it also aﬀects
16g∗ through its eﬀects on (a∗,ω ∗). As these are potentially complex general equilibrium
eﬀects, a priori it cannot be ruled out that higher R&D subsidies may even reduce
R&D-based growth.18 For instance, recall from Proposition 2 that an increase in τ
raises the equilibrium wage rate ω∗. Higher wages, however, are negatively associated
with equilibrium R&D investment, in turn impeding economic growth, all other things
being equal. To quantify the net eﬀect of a change in τ on the growth rate of per capita
income, g∗, we make use of a numerical example. The example will also be employed
to examine the eﬀects of a change in the population growth rate, gL.
Example: We specify h( R)=1+
√
 R and suppose that entrepreneurial ability
is uniformly distributed in the unit interval, i.e., ¯ a =1and the c.d.f. reads Φ(a)=a.







2(1 − τ)ω(1 + ¯ r)
!2
, (32)
according to (20). It can also be shown (available on request) that the threshold level
for entrepreneurial ability (above which individuals choose to become entrepreneur),
as deﬁn e di np a r t( i i )o fL e m m a1 ,i sg i v e nb y
˜ a(ω,τ,f,¯ r)=




















(It is easy to conﬁrm from (33) that ˜ aω > 0 and ˜ aτ < 0, as generally shown in Lemma
1.) Combining this in the labor market clearing condition, deﬁned in Lemma 2, we
18See, for instance, Segerstrom (2000) and Grossmann (2007) for models where higher R&D subsidies
may result in slower growth.
































1 − ˜ a(ω∗,τ,f,¯ r)
. (34)









1−α (1 − α)(1+a∗)
4(1 − τ)ω∗(1 + ¯ r)
, (35)
where a∗ =˜ a(ω∗,τ,f,¯ r). Interestingly, we have ˜ ga(a,ω,τ,¯ r) > 0, i.e., a higher fraction
of entrepreneurs reduces the economy’s growth rate, for a given productivity-adjusted
wage rate, ω. This possibility arises because the average productivity across ﬁrms in
the economy is relevant for income per worker and additional entrepreneurs imply that
more mediocre ones are opening ﬁrms.
3.3.1 R&D subsidies
τa ∗ ω∗ g∗ Ψ
0 0.655 0.421 0.362 1.117
0.1 0.656 0.423 0.397 1.126
0.2 0.659 0.425 0.441 1.134
0.3 0.663 0.427 0.496 1.145
0.4 0.670 0.431 0.567 1.154
0.5 0.680 0.435 0.662 1.164
Tab. 1. The impact of an increase in the R&D subsidy rate (τ)o nt h eB G E ;
α =0 .75, β =0 .3, f =1 , ¯ r =0 .2, gL =0 .05.
Tab. 1 shows that both the eﬀective R&D investment inputs (˜  R)i nB G Ea n d
the economy’s long-run growth rate are signiﬁcantly increasing in the R&D subsidy
18rate, τ.19 This demonstrates that economic growth is policy-dependent in the long-
run, in contrast to semi-endogenous growth models.20 The negative growth eﬀect
of a higher R&D subsidy which stems from an increase in the productivity-adjusted
wage rate, ω∗, is clearly dominated by positive growth eﬀects. The eﬀect on the
threshold ability level, a∗, i.e., the fraction of individuals not becoming entrepreneur,
is reasonably low.21 The last column in Tab. 1 shows the relative output of the most
able entrepreneur (with ability ¯ a =1 ) to the least able entrepreneur (with ability a∗).
Recalling qi =( α/c)
α
1−α Ai and (8), it equals relative product quality level, deﬁned as
Ψ ≡
h(˜  R(¯ a,·))
h(˜  R(a∗,·))
. (36)
Relative output level Ψ is increasing in τ. The most able entrepreneur produces between
11.7 percent (for τ =0 ) and 16.4 percent (for τ =0 .5) more output than the least able
entrepreneur.
3.3.2 The role of population growth
Endogenous growth models with weak scale eﬀects suggest that the economy’s long-run
growth rate is increasing in the rate of population growth, gL, an implication yet not
supported by empirical evidence. According to the framework proposed here, where
all scale eﬀects are absent, the population growth rate aﬀects important variables only
for a subtle reason: As pointed out already, entrepreneurs are older than workers in
the overlapping generations structure. This implies that the number of entrepreneurs
relative to workers in a given period, ˜ n(a,g L), is decreasing in the rate of population
growth, gL, holding the threshold ability level constant. As an implication, both ω∗
and a∗ are decreasing in gL.T h i sl e a v e st h en e te ﬀect on the long-run growth rate, g∗,
19This is conﬁrmed by using a wide range of alternative parameter conﬁgurations, not shown here
in order to save space. I also experimented with the alternative speciﬁcation h( R)=1+l n ( 1+ R)
and obtained similar results.
20The overlapping-generations structure suggests that one period equals one generation. For in-
stance, a compound growth rate (g∗) of 49.6 percent (for τ =0 .3 in Tab. 1) implies an annual growth
rate of 1.6 percent if the length of a generation is 25 years.
21Recall that this eﬀect is generally ambiguous.
19ambiguous (for the above example, recall that ˜ ga > 0 and ˜ gω < 0). In any case, due
to the minor economic importance of how population growth aﬀects the equilibrium
in the proposed model, one may suspect that higher population growth has a rather
negligible eﬀect on the important variables.
gL a∗ ω∗ g∗ Ψ
0 0.664 0.421 0.363 1.114
0.05 0.655 0.421 0.362 1.117
0.1 0.645 0.421 0.360 1.121
0.15 0.636 0.421 0.359 1.125
0.2 0.627 0.420 0.358 1.128
0.25 0.619 0.420 0.356 1.132
Tab. 2. The impact of an increase in the R&D subsidy rate (τ)o nt h eB G E ;
α =0 .75, β =0 .3, f =1 , ¯ r =0 .2, τ =0 .
This is conﬁrmed from Tab. 2, which shows how the variables reported in Tab. 1
depend on gL.22 T h el o n g - r u nr a t eo fe c o n o m i cg r o w t hi se v e nd e c l i n i n gi ngL, unlike
in section 2. However, raising the population growth rate from zero to 25 percent
changes g∗ from 36.3 to 35.6 percent only, which seems to be a rather small impact.
Also relative output level Ψ changes only slightly when gL increases.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The goal of this research was to demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
the scale of an economy in which long-run economic growth is driven by deliberate R&D
investments of private agents may not play a role for per capita income in the long-run.
The analysis was motivated by the mixed empirical evidence even for the weak form
of scale eﬀects. It is therefore potentially useful for the agenda of applying general
equilibrium models with endogenous technical change to identify the determinants of
long-run economic growth.
22The main conclusions drawn from Tab. 2 are again robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
20From a theoretical point of view, the analysis and its comparison with previous
literature made transparent which assumptions drive (long run) scale eﬀect properties.
The framework maintained the basic features of previous vertical innovation models
designed to remove strong scale eﬀects; it introduced entrepreneurial innovation and
endogenous occupational choice, however, to remove weak scale eﬀects as well.
In the proposed framework, long-run economic growth is sustained also without
population growth. It is generally policy-dependent, as shown by allowing for R&D
subsidies. However, there is much scope for extending the model to examine the im-
plications of a wider range of policy measures. Moreover, to focus on the scale eﬀect
issue, the analysis has emphasized long-run growth properties and has not addressed
issues like stability of the steady state equilibrium or comparative-static eﬀects on the
transition path towards it. As is true for previous models of endogenous growth, these
are challenging tasks, which are left for future research.
Appendix
A. BGE of Vertical Innovation Model in Section 2
Suppose that in the vertical innovation model of section 2.2 there is an inﬁnitely-living
representative dynasty with standard intertemporal utility function U =
P∞
t=0 Ltρt lnct,
0 <ρ<1,w h e r ect denotes per capita consumption in period t. This appendix shows
that there exists a symmetric BGE of the model, where the number of goods per worker
(n = N/L), the interest rate (r), R&D labor per ﬁrm (lR), and the fraction of labor
employed in the ﬁnal goods sector (lY = LY/L), are time-invariant.
First, note that ﬁnancial assets per capita, denoted by a, accumulate according
to (1 + gL)at+1 =( 1+rt)at + wt − ct,w h e r ewt d e n o t e st h ew a g er a t e( r e c a l lt h a t
Lt+1 =( 1 + gL)Lt). Utility maximization thus leads to Euler equation ct+1 = ρ(1+rt)ct.
T h ew a g er a t ei se q u a lt ot h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to fl a b o ri nt h eﬁnal goods sector;
according to (1), wt =( 1−γ)Yt/LY












Next, combine pit = rt/γ, xit =( γ2/rt)
1
1−γ AitLY
t and (4) to ﬁnd that the cash-ﬂow of
ﬁrm i in t is given by










In period t − 1, ﬁrm i chooses R&D labor input to maximize the value of net proﬁts
Πit−1 ≡ (1 + rt)−1πit − wt−1(lR
it−1 + f).I nv i e wo f( 3 8 )a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of ˜ ω in (37),
















D u et of r e ee n t r y ,i ne q u i l i b r i u m ,t h ev a l u eo fn e tp r o ﬁts becomes zero. In view of (38)






R∗ + f)=0 (40)
(superscript (*) denotes steady state values throughout). Thus, ¯ At+1/ ¯ At = h(lR∗),
a c c o r d i n gt o( 4 ) .I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a tt h ep r o p e r t i e so ff u n c t i o nh imply that lR∗ is




t /Lt can be written as
l
Y
t =1− nt+1(1 + gL)(l
R∗ + f). (41)
From the asset accumulation equation, in BGE, ct+1/ct = wt+1/wt.U s i n g wt =
¯ AtLt˜ ωt together with the property that ˜ ω is time-invariant in BGE (which will become
apparent), we ﬁnd ct+1/ct =( 1+gL)h(lR∗). From the Euler equation, the equilibrium






Using ˜ ωt−1 =˜ ωt =˜ ω∗, Lt =( 1+gL)Lt−1, lY
t = LY
t /Lt, and combining (37) with (39),
we also ﬁnd that in BGE h0(lR∗)(1 + gL)lY
t = γ(1 + r∗)nt. Substituting (41) and (42),
















It is thus obvious that there exists a BGE where n, r, lR, lY and ˜ ω are time-invariant.











R∗) − 1. (44)
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We ﬁrst need to solve for individual savings in t ≥ 1. Substituting
(16) and (17) into (18) and observing (11) for entrepreneurs, we ﬁnd that savings
of member i of generation t − 1, when adjusted to the stock of knowledge, sit−1 ≡









23t ≥ 1,w h e r e






1 − (1 − τ)













Denote utility of an individual i born in t − 1 who does not become entrepreneur by
UNonE
it−1 . Substituting (16) and (17) for non-entrepreneurs into (10), we obtain
U
NonE
it−1 =( 1+ρ)ln(1−τc)+ρlnρ−(1+ρ)ln(1+ρ)+(1+ρ)lnwt−1+ρln(1+¯ r), (47)
where τc denotes the consumption tax rate.
Similarly, let us denote utility of entrepreneur i born in t−1 by UE
it−1. Substituting
consumption levels (16) and (17) for entrepreneurs into (10) and observing (11), wt−1 =









(1 − τ)˜  R(ai,ω t−1,ct,τ,¯ r)
a





1−α h(˜  R(ai,ωt−1,ct,τ,¯ r))
ωt−1(1 + ¯ r)
!
(48)
A member of generation t − 1 with entrepreneurial ability ai becomes entrepreneur if
UE
it−1 ≥ UNonE
it−1 . Using (48) and observing the deﬁnition of G in (23), this inequality











1−α h0(˜  R(a,·))






(1 − τ)˜  R
a(a,·)
a2 . (49)
Using (20), by applying the envelope theorem, one ﬁnds that the term in squared
brackets of (49) is zero; thus, Ga(a,·) > 0.I f lima→0 G(a,·) < 0,w h i c hm a yh o l d
as f>0, G(a,·) increases, from a negative value for small a,a sa increases. Hence,
24any ability level a such that G(a,ω,c,τ,¯ r,f)=0is unique. This conﬁrms part (i).
Regarding part (ii), observe ﬁrst from the deﬁnition of ˜ G that Ga > 0 implies ˜ Ga > 0.
Moreover, using again (20), we ﬁnd Gτ > 0, Gω < 0 and Gc < 0. Together with the facts
that c = ˜ c(ω,¯ r) and ˜ cω(ω,¯ r) > 0, the latter two properties imply ˜ Gω = Gω + Gc˜ cω < 0
whereas the ﬁrst property implies ˜ Gτ > 0. Applying the implicit function theorem, we
have ˜ aω = − ˜ Gω/ ˜ Ga > 0 and ˜ aτ = − ˜ Gτ/ ˜ Ga < 0. This concludes the proof. ¥



















it + f)di =1 . (50)
Using (50) together with (20) conﬁrms (27). ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 1 and 2 imply that, in a BGE, (a∗,ω∗) are
given by ˜ G(a∗,ω ∗,τ,f,¯ r)= ˜ H(a∗,ω∗,g L,τ,f,¯ r)=0 . Substituting a =˜ a(ω,τ,f,¯ r) as
deﬁned in part (ii) of Lemma 2 into ˜ H, we obtain that ω∗ is given by
0= ˜ H(˜ a(ω
∗,τ,f,¯ r),ω
∗,g L,τ,f,¯ r) ≡ ˆ H(ω
∗,g L,τ,f,¯ r). (51)
From (27) together with the deﬁnition of ˜ H and the properties of ˜  R(a,ω,c,τ,¯ r),
˜ n(a,g L) and ˜ c(ω,¯ r) we ﬁnd that ˜ Ha < 0 and ˜ Hω < 0. Also recall from part (ii) of
Lemma 1 that ˜ aω > 0. Hence, ˆ Hω = ˜ Ha˜ aω + ˜ Hω < 0.T h u s , ω∗ as given by (51) is
unique. This conﬁrms part (i). To prove part (ii), note that ˆ Hτ = ˜ Ha˜ aτ + ˜ Hτ.F r o m
(27) and (28), we ﬁnd that ˜ Ha < 0 and ˜ Hτ > 0, where the latter property stems
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a t˜  R is increasing in τ.U s i n g ˜ aτ < 0 f r o mL e m m a1 ,w et h u sh a v e
ˆ Hτ = ˜ Ha˜ aτ + ˜ Hτ > 0. Recalling ˆ Hω < 0 and using ∂ω∗/∂τ = − ˜ Hτ/ ˜ Hω also conﬁrms
part (ii). ¥










∗, ¯ r),τ,¯ r))dΦ(a). (52)
Using (52) conﬁrms that g ¯ A is given by the right-hand side of (31). From (29) and
(30) it is obvious that y∗ and k∗ grow at the same rate as well. To conﬁrm that there
are neither strong nor weak scale eﬀects, recall that both a∗ and ω∗ are independent
of population size. ¥
C. Steady State in a Closed Economy
This appendix shows that also in a closed economy, where the interest rate is endoge-
nous, there are no scale eﬀects in BGE. To show this, we ﬁrst employ the additional
equilibrium condition for a closed economy that aggregate savings of individuals for
old age are equal to capital demand in the intermediate goods sector.
The aggregate capital supply in t is given by













To see this, use that a share Φ(at) of individuals born in t − 1 retire in t and that for
entrepreneur i born in t − 1, sit−1 = ˜ s(ai,ωt−1,ct,τ,r t,f) holds in a closed economy.
Next we derive capital demand. Substituting (52) into (14), we obtain















where we used that  R
it−1 = ˜  R(ai,ωt−1,ct,τ,r t) in a closed economy.






















≡ J(at,ωt−1,ω t,ct,τ,r t,f). (55)
We can deﬁne ˜ J(a,ω,r,τ,f) ≡ J(a,ω,ω,˜ c(ω,r),τ,r,f). In a steady state equi-
librium, equilibrium values (a∗,ω ∗,r ∗) are therefore given by the equation system
˜ G(a∗,ω ∗,τ,f,r ∗)= ˜ H(a∗,ω ∗,g L,τ,r ∗)= ˜ J(a∗,ω∗,r ∗,τ,f)=0 .T h u s ,(a∗,ω∗,r ∗) are
independent of population size. Moreover, we can replace ¯ r by r∗ in both (29) and (31)
to obtain expressions for the level and growth rate of per capita income in steady state,
respectively. This conﬁrms that also in BGE of a closed economy, there are neither
weak nor strong scale eﬀects.
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